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The present paper examines when, for any given preference profile or set of individual preference
orders, is it possible to define a procedure independent or objective aggregate ranking of the alternatives,
such that the aggregate ranking qualifies as the ”will of the people”. It also investigates what message
is being conveyed by the profile, when different procedures come up with different aggregate rankings.
Specifically, the paper establishes a profile decomposition methodology that allows us to answer these
two questions and tests this methodology on ballot data from the Cambridge City Council elections. Our
method is easy to implement and admits any number of candidates. The empirical results based on the
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1 Introduction
Aggregation paradoxes that arise when a collective ranking of multiple alternatives is constructed from a
set of individual preference orders on them, pose significant challenges for a democracy. Two such prob-
lems have drawn the most attention from scholars, beginning with the 18th and 19th century writings of
Borda (1781), Condorcet (1785), Dodgson1 (1884) and Nanson (1882). First, for a fixed set of the indi-
vidual voters’ rankings of the alternatives, different aggregation procedures may yield different aggregate
or social rankings of the alternatives with no natural reason to prefer one procedure over another. Second,
under any given aggregation procedure, rank reversals in the aggregate ranking may occur when alterna-
tives are dropped or added. We describe these problems, henceforth as procedure dependency and internal
inconsistency, respectively.
As the first ranked alternative in an aggregate ranking is most often the chosen or elected alternative in
a democratic process, such problems imply that the (choice) outcome may reflect the somewhat arbitrary
choice of the procedure rather than the true ”will of the people” and, further, can be manipulated. Two
existing theorems in social choice theory illustrate the potentially extreme form of this arbitrariness. One
states that with more than three candidates (alternatives), a profile of individual preferences may be found,
such that each candidate or alternative is top ranked, second ranked... last ranked in the aggregate ranking
with an appropriate choice of an aggregation method. (Theorem 9, Saari 2000b). The other says, a profile
may be found such that the voters’ sincere plurality ranking of each subset of candidates matches an ar-
bitrarily chosen one. (Theorem 1, Saari 2000b). Thus, the profile or set of individual preference orders is
fixed, implying that the ”will of the people” - whatever it is - is constant. However, an attempt to express
it by means of an aggregate ranking produces different results under different procedures and for different
subsets of the candidates. In fact, a most natural question under the circumstances is, what is the ”will of
the people”.
A broad objective of the present paper is to examine when can a clear answer to the above question be
provided. It explores, firstly, if, for any given profile of individual preference orders, it is possible to define
a procedure independent (all procedures providing the same answer) or objective aggregate ranking of the
alternatives, such that this ranking may be described as the ”will of the people”. Secondly, we investigate
what message, from a collective perspective, is conveyed by a profile, when different procedures come up
with different aggregate rankings. Specifically, the paper establishes an implementable methodology that
decomposes any given profile into component profiles with meaningful collective characteristics and enables
1better known as ”Lewis Caroll”, the author of Alice in Wonderland
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us to answer these two questions. Further, we test this methodology on profiles of individual preference
orders revealed by the ballot data from the Cambridge City Council, Massachussetts, elections.
By showing that no aggregation method simultaneously satisfies even a minimal set of four desir-
able properties - unrestricted domain, unanimity, independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) and non-
dictatorial - Arrow’s seminal work (1951) demonstrates why no method is naturally better than others. The
literature on aggregation methods has developed in multiple directions since then. A line of research fo-
cuses on comparative studies of the procedures, specially with respect to aggregation properties that are
often deemed essential or desirable, including but not limited to the four laid out by Arrow.2 A second
line of research following Black’s (1958) seminal paper, investigates whether some of these properties that
are incompatible on the unrestricted domain of all possible rankings of the alternatives are compatible on a
(proper) subset of the set of all possible rankings, at least. Amongst the major contributors are May (1952),
Dasgupta and Maskins (2008).
A very recent and complementary approach, pioneered by Saari (1999; 2000a; 2000b amongst others)
and described as geometric voting theory, explores whether some of these properties are compatible on the
the set of all possible rankings but for a restricted class of profiles or distribution of voters across all possible
rankings. Hodge and Klima (2005) and to some extent, Balinski and Laraki (2010) provide expositions of
the linear algebraic framework, techniques and many of Saari’s important results. The present paper adopts
this approach as the most useful one for addressing our questions.
A highlight of this linear algebraic approach and one of Saari’s most important contributions is the idea
that a given preference profile (or distribution of voters across all possible rankings) can be expressed as a
sum of different types of component profiles such that specific component profiles influence the outcome
of specific aggregation procedures but not of others. For example, Saari identifies component profiles that
influence aggregation outcomes under any specific procedure for different subsets of candidates and profiles
that influence outcomes under pairwise but not under positional aggregation methods.3 The profile decom-
position approach can be adapted to serve different objectives. It can be used as Saari has used it, to gain a
deep understanding of the aggregation paradoxes and why they occur. With this goal in mind, he constructs
a set of orthogonal component profiles that would act as a basis for the space of all possible profiles, with
2Major contributions include the work of Sen and Pattanaik (1969), Young (1974, 1975, 1988), Young and Levenglick (1978),
Smith (1973), Fishburn (1984), Moulin (1988), Nurmi (2004) amongst others. Nurmi (1996, 2002), Balinski and Laraki (2010), and
Brahms(2002) provide comprehensive and excellent surveys of this vast literature. One way to select an appropriate procedure is to
recognize that aggregation methods serve two very different purposes - determining a collective winner amongst several alternatives
and providing a collective or social ranking of the alternatives. Thus some methods are more appropriate for determining winners
and some for ranking candidates. Balinski and Laraki (2010) provides a detailed and comprehensive treatment of this debate.
3The first type of profiles are described by him as Departure profiles. The second type of profiles are the well known Condorcet
profiles.
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specific basis components influencing specific procedures but not others. This is a computationally demand-
ing task and requires, amongst other things, the construction and inversion of a matrix of n! dimension, for
a n candidate field.
Alternatively, as we do in this paper, the approach can be used to decompose a given profile into only
component profiles that admit distinctive collective identities. When, for any given profile, different ag-
gregation procedures arrive at different answers, such components convey information about the electorate
that is useful. The main methodological contribution of this paper is an easily implementable technique to
do this. The advantages of our technique is that it allows any number of candidates without introducing
the curse of dimensionality mentioned above and further, avoids references to component profiles that may
help explain aggregation paradoxes but otherwise admit little or no collective character.4 We follow up our
methodological contribution with an analysis of the Cambridge City Council, Massachussetts, ballot data
for the period 1997-2011, using our techniques.
The paper focuses on three types of component profiles with meaningful collective characters. The first
is the long well known Condorcet profile, a set of cyclic rankings, each supported by an equal number of
voters. Under such a profile, each candidate is supported in each position by an equal number of voters,
thus indicating a form of preference heterogeneity. The second type of component profile is described by
us as Reverse profiles and assigns an equal number of voters to each ranking that has a specific candidate in
the first and last places. Such profiles, identified early on by Young (1975) amongst others, indicate a form
of preference polarization within an electorate, as they reflect blocks of voters with diametrically opposite
preference rankings. Thus the weights of the Condorcet and Reverse profiles within a given profile measure
how fragmented society is, in two different senses. Heterogeneity indicates diversity of preferences, polar-
ization indicates clustering into groups of opposites. A useful feature of our approach is that it distinguishes
between these two different ways in which society may be divided and provides characterizations and mea-
sures of both.5 A substantive contribution of our paper is that, based on preferences revealed by a section of
the US voters, it provides hard evidence of increasing political polarization.
The third type of component profile with a distinctive collective character and identified by Saari, is the
Basic profile.6 Under a Basic profile there are more voters who rank a specific candidate in the first place
compared to the number of voters who rank each of the other alternatives in the first place and no voter
ranks the specific candidate in question in the last place. A most interesting property of a Basic profile is
4Saari (2000b) notes for instance, that Departure profiles that cause internal inconsistency have ”sufficiently bizarre” forms and
hence highly unlikely to ever arise. See Remark 1 below, for more discussion.
5A similar distinction is made in the literature on income distribution. See Esteban and Ray (1994) amongst others.
6See Saari (1999; 2000a,b) amongst others. Although he is credited with introducing and characterizing Basic profiles, the
decomposition method used in these papers cannot be easily used to extract the weights of these profiles - a gap filled by our work.
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that on such a profile, under any aggregation procedure, the specified candidate is always placed first in
the aggregate ranking and all the other candidates are tied for the second place. Thus all procedures agree
on Basic profiles. Further, the aggregate ranking thus obtained, satisfy Arrow’s IIA property and hence is
consistent over any subset of candidates.
As all procedures agree on Basic profiles, an objective or procedure independent aggregate ranking
can be obtained for any given profile, if the latter can be expressed either as a pure combination of Basic
profiles or as a combination of Basic, Condorcet and Reverse profiles, where the weights of the latter are
not significant relative to the weights of the Basic profiles. As the weights of the Condorcet and Reverse
profiles get larger relative to the Basic profile weights, aggregation outcomes under different procedures
become more disparate from each other and move farther away from the aggregation outcome on Basic
profiles. Thus the higher the weights of the Condorcet and Reverse components of a profile - that is, the
more fragmented society is - the more diluted is the message conveyed by the aggregate ranking based on
Basic profiles.
An aggregate ranking based on Basic profiles has the twin advantage of being procedure independent
and consistent over subsets, implying that such a ranking cannot be manipulated through choice of procedure
or strategic participation in races. Further, both Condorcet and Reverse profiles feature certain symmetries
which justify interpreting them as complete ties amongst the candidates so far as elections are concerned,
under the impartiality or equal treatment of voters argument. Thus, impartiality requires that Condorcet and
Reverse profile components be ignored and an election be declared based on the aggregate ranking obtained
from Basic profiles only. However, a sizable presence of Condorcet and Reverse profiles also indicate that
society is very divided. We submit that although an aggregate ranking that is impartial and non-manipulable
is the best that we can do under the circumstances, we should not designate it, the ”will of the people”. Thus,
an additional benefit of a profile decomposition technology is that by providing us with the relative weights
of all three types of profiles, it also enables us to understand, when is aggregation meaningful.
The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the existing concepts and tools of
geometric voting theory that are useful for us. Sections 3 and 4 introduce Reverse profiles, our main theo-
retical results and the decomposition technology. The weights of the Condorcet and Reverse components of
a profile provide natural measures of heterogeneity and polarization among an electorate that are discussed
in Section 5. Finally, in Section 6, we test our method and measures on ballot data from the Cambridge City
Council, Massachussetts, elections.
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2 The algebra of geometric voting theory
2.1 Basic and Condorcet profiles
Voters have strict transitive preferences over n candidates indexed i = 1 . . .n. Hence there are n! different
ways of ranking these candidates. Assume an electorate of a given and fixed size. A profile p= (p1 . . . pn!)∈
Rn!+ is a distribution of voters across these rankings, with p j = the number of voters with preferences given
by the jth ranking of the candidates. A profile differential p′ ∈ Rn! is the difference between two different
profiles for an electorate of a given size. Thus p′ may have negative components and further, the components
of p′ add up to zero.7
An analytically useful type of profile with a collective character is the Kn ∈ Rn!+ profile, that has one
voter for each possible ranking - in other words, a Kn profile characterizes an equitable distribution of voters
across all possible rankings. Further, a Kn profile yields a tied outcome across all candidates under any
procedure and hence the relative ranking of candidates are not affected by addition or subtraction of a Kn
profile to any other given profile, under any procedure. Addition of a Kn profiles to other profiles changes
the aggregate tallies but not the differences in tallies between any two candidates.8
Assuming that the total number of voters distributed over the n! rankings is V , it is useful to view
any given profile p as a perturbation from a Vn! K
n profile. In other words, it is convenient to define p as
V
n! K
n + p′ for some profile differential p′ ∈ Rn!. For example, consider the profile p = (13,11,9,8,11,0)
of 52 voters with three candidates described in Table 2. p can be expressed as 526 K
3 + p′ where p′ =
(266 ,
14
6 ,
2
6 ,−46 , 146 ,−526 ). To understand the usefulness of viewing a profile thus (as a sum of a weighted Kn
profile and a profile differential), first note that as Vn! K
n has completely tied outcomes for all candidates under
any procedure, the profile differential p′ yields the same ranking of the candidates as p under any procedure.
That is under any procedure, the tallies of p and p′ may differ but the ranking outcome is the same. Thus for
analytical purposes, a profile p and an appropriate profile differential p′ are equivalent. Moreover, viewed
thus, a profile p of an electorate of size V is obtained from an equitable distribution of the voters (a Vn! K
n
profile) by moving voters away from specific rankings and adding them to other specific rankings. That
is, any profile p is a result of ”padding” and ”thinning” of specific rankings of an equitable distribution of
voters. This view is particularly useful for us as the various types of component profiles introduced below
are structured ”padding” and ”thinning” of a weighted Kn profile.
7In presenting the necessary concepts from geometric voting theory, we stick to Saari’s terminology for the most part and
sometimes his notations, in recognition of the pioneering nature of his work. We do however, occasionally deviate and use our own
names, if we feel that these are more intuitive or if a subtle distinction in our specific context is necessary.
8There are many other types of profile with the feature that under any procedure, they produce completely tied outcomes.
Saari(2000a,b) terms the set of such profiles as the Universal Kernel.
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The preceding discussion shows that a profile differential rather than a profile can be used as the analyt-
ical building block of the geometric approach. The advantage of this (as noted by Saari) is that as a profile
differential p′ is orthogonal to Kn, a decomposition of p′ does not include neutral Kn effects. An alternative
and useful view of a profile differential is that it is a profile with the number of voters normalized to zero.
To understand the structure of a Basic profile first fix a candidate, say i. Take a Kn profile and shift
a voter from each ranking which has i last ranked and add the voter to a ranking which has i first ranked,
taking care not to add more than one such voter to a ranking. The profile p(i) thus obtained equals Kn+ p′(i)
where the profile differential p′(i) has one voter for each ranking that has i top ranked, (-1) voter for each
ranking that has i bottom ranked and 0 voter for each ranking that has i ranked somewhere in the middle.
We define the profile differential p′(i) as a Basic profile favoring candidate i and denote it by Bni . Following
our previous discussion, p(i) and Bni yield the same ranking of the candidates and are interchangeable. Thus
the term Basic profile may be used to refer to either. Under a Basic profile, candidate i is some voter’s first
choice and nobody’s last choice. Further, the number of voters who rank candidate i first is greater than the
number of voters who rank any other candidate j, first. Thus under any pairwise or positional procedure,
the aggregate ranking for this profile will have the i-th candidate top ranked and everyone else tied in the
second place. Voters making up Bni collectively like the i-th candidate more than any other candidate and
are completely indifferent across the others. By a slight stretch of the imagination (and perhaps abuse of
terms), a Basic profile may be used to describe the preferences of the voters making up the popular ”base”
of a candidate.
Different Basic profiles are easy to aggregate. Suppose a given profile p can be expressed as, p =
V
n! K
n+a1Bn1+a2B
n
2+ . . .+anB
n
n, where ai’s are given constants. The pairwise score difference (see the next
subsection) between candidates i and j can be shown to be ai−a j. The difference in positional tallies under
any positional procedure can also be shown to be a multiple of ai− a j, with a common multiplier across
all pairs. Thus under any procedure, in an aggregate ranking, the relative rank of two candidates depend
only on their relative Basic profile weights and are unaffected by the presence of a third candidate. For a
profile that is a sum of Basic profiles, as the relative rank of the (i, j) pair in an aggregate ranking under any
procedure depends only on (ai−a j), it cannot be altered by an appropriate choice of procedure or strategic
participation by other candidates in the race. We therefore claim that under such a profile, the difference
between the two candidates or their relative ranking is ”true” or objective.
To define a Condorcet profile, first specify and fix a reference ranking of the candidates, say 1 > 2 >
3 . . . > n, and denote this ranking as (1). A Condorcet n-tuple generated by the reference ranking (1), cn(1),
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is the set of n rankings of the candidates described by the first column of Table 1. The reverse of this set,
ρ(c(1))n, is another set of n rankings of the candidates described by the second column of Table 1. The sets
cn(1) and ρ(c(1))
n are thus two specific sets of cyclic rankings of the candidates, with the feature that each
ranking in the set ρ(c(1))n is a reversal of a ranking in cn(1). There are many distinct Condorcet n-tuples in
the set of n! possible rankings of the candidates, each with an associated reversal set and each identified by
its first or reference ranking.
Table 1:
cn(1) ρ(c(1))
n
1 > 2 > 3 . . . > n n > n−1 > n−2 . . . > 1
2 > 3 > 4 . . . > 1 n−1 > n−2 > n−3 . . . > n
3 > 4 > 5 . . . > 2 n−2 > n−3 > n−4 . . . > n−2
. . . . . .
n > 1 > 2 . . . > n−1 1 > n−1 > n−2 . . . > 2
A Condorcet profile Cn(1) associated with the reference ranking (1), is a profile that has one voter for
each ranking in cn(1) and (-1) voter for each ranking in ρ(c
n
(1)) and zero voter for each remaining ranking in
the profile. Cn(1) has the same structure and tallies as aK
n profile with a voter moved away from each of the
ρ(cn(1)) rankings and added to each of the c
n
(1) rankings. Under a C
n
(1) profile, each candidate is placed in each
position by exactly the same number of voters. Thus under any positional method, such a profile produces a
complete tie - a feature that is common to both the Kn profile and Condorcet profiles. A Kn profile however
also produces a pairwise tie for every candidate pair as a ranking and its reversal are supported by the same
number of voters. This is not true of Condorcet profiles as voters have been shifted from the ρ(cn(1)) rankings
and added to the cn(1) rankings.
As a Condorcet profile is uniquely defined by its first reference ranking, a n candidate field has (n−1)!2
distinct Condorcet profiles - a number which gets large very quickly, as n increases. By contrast, an n-
candidate field has n Basic related by ∑i Bni = 0 - implying only n−1 of these are distinct.
2.2 Pairwise scores
Pairwise aggregation methods are based on pairwise comparisons of candidates. Condorcet’s successive
reversal and the maximal agreement procedures, Kemeny’s method, Copeland’s method are commonly used
examples. Given a preference-profile p, we begin by counting the number of voters who rank i over j and
call this i’s pairwise tally against j. The normalized difference in the pairwise scores of candidates i and j
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is then given as
ai j =
(i’s tally against j− j’s tally against i)
total number of voters
Thus for each pair of candidates, −1 ≤ ai j ≤ 1, with a value of 0 indicating a pairwise tie between
the two candidates, and values of -1 and + 1 respectively indicating unanimous loss or win by candidate i
against candidate j. Further note that ai j =−a ji. A vector a= {ai j}i, j=1...N,i< j of normalized pairwise score
differentials defines a point in the cube BS(n) ⊂ RnC2 , defined by the nC2 intervals [−1,1] (BS stands for
Binary Score).
Pairwise score differences are not defined for profile differentials as the number of voters is normalized
to zero. However as the pairwise tally differences are defined for profile differentials, it is possible to char-
acterize the directional vectors for the pairwise score differences. A Basic profile Bni generates a directional
vector of pairwise score differences, T ni ∈ BS(n) that has the following structure: ai j = 1 for all j 6= i and
a jk = 0 for all j,k 6= i. That is, under a Bni profile, i defeats all j’s unanimously in pairwise contests and the
other pairwise contests not involving i are all ties. To see why, note that under a Bni profile, (n−1)! voters
rank i over j and −(n− 1)! voters rank j over i. The latter are accounted for by the voters who rank i last
and so rank j above i. Rankings in which i is not first or last placed are supported by 0 number of voters
each.
The collection {T ni }ni=1 of directional vectors generated by the n Basic profiles, in BS(n), can be shown
to span a (n− 1) dimensional subspace T ⊂ BS(n) called the Transitivity plane by Saari. Basic profiles
and the Transitivity plane have a very useful additive transitivity property: For any subset of k out of n
candidates and any permutation of the indices, ∑k−1j=1 a j j+1 = a1k. Thus, a pairwise score between the (i, j)
pair can be expressed as the sum of pairwise scores of other pairs chosen in an order. This property ensures
that procedural dependency and internal inconsistency never happen with Basic profiles.
Directional vectors of pairwise score differences generated by the Condorcet profiles are more difficult
to characterize (especially for large n) than the ones generated by the Basic profiles, as such a characteriza-
tion depends on the specific reference ranking for each distinct Condorcet profile. However the following
algorithm is useful to understand how such a vector may be generated, once a reference ranking is fixed.
Note, that the pairwise tallies of (i, j) for a Condorcet profile are given by (n− 2s) : (2s− n) if i is ranked
s candidates above j in the reference ranking, where either n−2s or 2s−n is negative unless n = 2s. This
implies that the normalized pairwise score differentials of any pair, ai j, in a Condorcet profile corresponding
to the specific reference ranking, is 1 if n−2s > 0, implying i wins unanimously over j: it is -1 if n−2s < 0,
implying j wins unanimously over i; or it is 0 if n−2s = 0, implying both are tied. The subspace spanned
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by the set of vectors of pairwise score differentials generated by the distinct Condorcet profiles is described
as the Condorcet subspace and denoted C⊂ BS(n).9
A Condorcet profile generates an intransitive pairwise ranking amongst the alternatives, although indi-
viduals making up the profile are fully rational and have strict transitive rankings. When a component of a
larger profile, they cause pairwise aggregation methods to disagree on their aggregate ranking, depending
on their weights relative to the Basic profiles. Significant weights result in intransitive aggregate rankings.
This results from a feature of pairwise scores in general, namely such scores cannot distinguish between a
Condorcet profile and a profile of irrational voters with intransitive rankings.10
A very useful result by Saari (2000a, Proposition 5) shows that pairwise score differences, ai j, are
determined only by the Basic and Condorcet components of a preference profile. Other types of profiles
contribute nothing towards these values. Denote a ∈ BS(n) = {ai j}. The result says a = aT + aC, where
aT ∈T and aC ∈C. aT and aC are described respectively as the Transitive and Condorcet component vectors
of the pairwise score vector a by Saari - a terminology we retain. The component vector aT is determined
by the weights of the Basic profiles. Specifically, the component aTi j = ai− a j. The component vector aC
is contributed by the set of Condorcet profiles. Unlike aTi j however, the component a
C
i j does not have a neat
expression.
The Appendix I provides 3-candidate illustrations of all the major ideas and results presented in this
sub-section.
Under Condorcet profiles each candidate is supported in each position by an equal number of voters.
Preference heterogeneity has multiple connotations. By pointing towards an even distribution of voters
across candidates for a specific place in a ranking, a Condorcet profile reflects an extreme form of hetero-
geneity.This is however not the only type of profile that reflects heterogeneity. A Kn profile does the same
and yields the same positional tallies as a Condorcet profile. A Condorcet profile however affects pairwise
scores, whereas a Kn profile does not.
3 Reverse profiles, polarized preferences and plurality
Positioinal or sum-scoring methods assign fixed points to a candidate depending upon his/her position in
an individual’s ranking.11 Assume an electorate of size 1 and denote the space of normalized profiles as
9The (n−1)!2 distinct Condorcet profiles span a subspace of dimension nC2 − (n−1) = (n−1)C2 in BS(n), a higher dimensional
subspace compared to the Transitivity plane for n > 4.
10As pointed out by Saari, pairwise methods produce consistent rankings over subsets of candidates but at the cost of ”weakening
or ignoring the rationality of voters”.
11Plurality and Borda Counts are commonly used examples.
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P(n!) = {p = (p1 . . . pn!)|∑ p j = 1, p j ≥ 0}. The plurality method involves a voter awarding 1 point to
his/her first ranked candidate and 0 to all other candidates placed in other positions in his/her ranking.
Plurality tallies are the sum of all the points awarded by all the voters. A normalized plurality score is a
mapping, PS(p) = (ps1 . . . psn) : P(n!)−→ S(n), where psi is the proportion of the electorate who has i first
ranked and S(n) = {psi}|∑ni=1 psi = 1 is the unit simplex in Rn+.
The Borda Count (BC) assigns n− 1 points to the first ranked candidate of each voter, n− 2 points
to the second ranked candidate and so on. BC ranking can also be shown to be equivalent to ranking the
candidates according to the sum of their normalized pairwise scores against other candidates - that is, ranking
the candidates by assigning the ith candidate a score of ∑ j 6=i ai j. Thus a Borda Count can be shown to be a
pairwise as well as a positional or sum scoring aggregation method.
The main task of this section is to introduce profiles that (1) produce pairwise ties (2) are orthogonal to
Basic profiles and (3) influence the plurality tallies of specific candidates but not of others. We begin with a
definition.
Definition 1 Fix an integer k, such that 2≤ k≤ n+12 . For k < n+12 , a generic (first place) Reverse profile, Rni ,
has 1 voter for each ranking in which the i-th candidate is first and last ranked, (-1) voter for each ranking
in which he/she is k-th ranked and to the reversal of this ranking and 0 voters for all other rankings. If
k = n+12 , the profile has 1 voter for each ranking in which the candidate is first and last ranked, (-2) voters
for each ranking in which the candidate is k-th ranked and 0 voters for all other rankings.
To understand the structure of the Reverse profile Rni , assume n > 3 and k = 2. R
n
i has the same structure
and tallies as a Kn profile with a voter moved from each ranking in which i is either second or (n− 1)th
ranked and added to a ranking in which i is first or last ranked. In words, such a profile is obtained by
padding the rankings in which i is placed at the two extremes and thinning the rankings in which i is placed
somewhere in the middle. The exact choice of k is not material to the concept of a Reverse profile, as we
explain further.
Remark 1: Generic (first place) Reverse profiles are similar but not identical in construction to the
Symmetric profiles of Saari (2000b) - hence, our use of a different name. Saari’s construction is motivated by
the fact that positional tallies needed to be expressed as deviations from the Borda Count (2000b, Proposition
1) as the weights of the Basic profiles are not directly available. In the absence of direct information about
the weights of the Basic profiles, the Borda Count can be used as a surrogate, because Borda scores are
influenced only by Basic profiles. In addition to Symmetric profiles, Saari introduces many other types of
profiles in the paper, to continue with the task of decomposition in the absence of direct information about
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the weights of Basic profiles. A problem with some of these profiles however is that their structures do
not readily admit meaningful collective interpretations as Condorcet and Reverse profiles do, although they
are very useful for explaining exactly how aggregation paradoxes happen. Our approach provides direct
information about Basic profiles and is able to bypass such problems.
Remark 2: Adding an appropriate Kn profile shows that under a generic (first place) Reverse profile,
each ranking and its reverse are supported by the same number of voters - hence the name”Reverse” profile.
Impartiality or equal treatment of voters justify cancelling a ranking against its reversal because of this and
hence interpreting these profiles as complete ties between the candidates, as far as elections are concerned.
Note however that socio-politically such a profile indicates polarized preferences, as an equal number of
voters place a specific candidate in the first and last positions. Hence, as in the case of Condorcet profiles,
depending on the weight of these Reverse profiles, excluding them implies loss of important information
about voters’ preferences.
Remark 3: The main purpose behind defining the Reverse profiles with reference to a fixed k, is to
ensure that Rni is a profile differential. The specific choice of k does not matter for our analysis, as the proofs
below show and hence the description ”generic” Reverse profiles. Further, as our specific focus is plurality,
these Reverse profiles are defined with a positive number of voters for every ranking with i in the first place
(hence the description ”first place” Reverse profiles). However, the definition can be generalized for the
m-th place to study other sum scoring or positional methods, such as assigning 1 point each to the first two
candidates in any individual ranking.
For any given k, there are n (first place) Reverse profiles for a n-candidate field, related by ∑ni=1 Rni = 0.
The following proposition lays out the properties of these profiles, for a given k.
Proposition 1 For a given k,
1. The set of {Rni }i=1...n profiles are not pairwise orthogonal to each other and span a (n−1) dimensional
subspace of the profile space.
2. The set of {Rni }i=1...n profiles are pairwise orthogonal to the set of {Bni }i=1...n profiles.
3. The plurality tallies of Bni and R
n
i profiles are identical, with candidate I receiving (n−1)! points and
every other candidate receiving −(n− 2)! points each. The pairwise scores for each candidate pair
under a Rni profile is a complete tie.
Proof: See Appendix II. The Appendix also provides 3 and 4 candidate illustrations whenever useful.
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As the proofs make clear that the specific choice of k does not matter for these properties, we assume
without loss of generality that k = 2 for the rest of the paper. We also refer to these profiles simply as
Reverse profiles. The following is a main result of this paper.
Theorem 1 Differences in plurality tallies for any two candidates are fully explained by Basic and generic
first place Reverse profiles.
Proof: Differences in tallies under any specific procedure are not affected by neutral profiles such as
Kn which influences these tallies uniformly for all candidates. Hence these differentials are explained by
Basic profiles and profiles orthogonal to Basic profiles that affect plurality tallies. Condorcet profiles do
not affect differences in any positional and specifically plurality tallies, as each alternative is supported in
each position by the same number of voters, implying these tallies are the same for all candidates. Profiles
orthogonal to Basic profiles that affect plurality tallies for a specific candidate must have an equal number
of voters for each ranking with the candidate in the first and last places. Note that the structure of the rest
of the profile - for the rankings which have the specific candidate in other positions - does not matter. Such
profiles are therefore fully characterized by generic Reverse profiles. ∆.
A main implication of Proposition 1 is that although the Reverse profiles are orthogonal to the Basic
profiles, the plurality tallies lie in an identical direction. Thus to extract the component attributable to
Reverse profiles only, the weights of the Basic profiles need to be isolated first.
4 Isolating component profiles
4.1 Isolating Basic and Condorcet profiles
The previous two sections show that Condorcet and Reverse profiles cause aggregate rankings to differ
from the objective ranking induced by Basic profiles under standard procedures, and to differ from each
other. Further, although these profiles can be interpreted as ties across the candidates as far as elections are
concerned, they convey important information about voter’s collective preferences that cannot be ignored.
In this section, we focus on the task of extracting the weights of the Basic, Condorcet and Reverse profiles.
We assume that a given profile p is obtained from a Vn! K
n profile by padding it with (n− 1) Basic,
1
2(n− 1)! Condorcet and (n− 1) distinct Reverse profiles. In other words p is a linear combination of all
these component profiles. The decomposition techniques discussed in this section requires pairwise and
plurality tallies. We therefore assume that such scores are available. Further, denote by ai, the coefficient of
the Basic profile Bni , in this combination.
12
The first step is to isolate the weights ai’s. An obvious way is to use Saari’s Proposition 5 (2000a) to ex-
tract the component vector aT from the pairwise scores. The curse of dimensionality however makes a direct
application of this proposition difficult for any arbitrary n, because the first step requires characterizing all
the directional vectors of the pairwise score differentials generated by the (n−1)!2 distinct Condorcet profiles.
We therefore use a result and an algorithm presented in Chandra and Roy (2012/2013) which allows us to
extract the component aT rather easily from the pairwise scores.
Let a(0)i j denote the given initial pairwise score differences in an election between i and j. This is the
data. The Chandra and Roy (2013) method consists of revising the initial given scores according to the
formula
a(1)i j = a
(0)
i j +CF. ∑
k 6=i, j
(a(0)ik +a
(0)
k j ),∀i, j (1)
where CF , a confidence factor, is a number chosen from the interval [0,1/2].
To understand the formula, note that pairwise scores generate an intransitive ranking over a Condorcet
profile - although the individual voters making up the profile have strict transitive rankings - because such
scores do not use the full information provided by the complete set of multilateral rankings making up the
profile. Instead they use partial information about the profile in the form of selective binary components
of these rankings. In Saari’s words, pairwise scores do not recognize or use the transitivity property of the
individual rankings, for the notion of transitivity is irrelevant over two candidates. The aggregate ranking
A > B, B >C and C > A may as well be generated by a Condorcet profile of voters with strictly transitive
preferences as by a profile of irrational voters with intransitive preferences across the candidates.
The Chandra-Roy (2013) algorithm essentially restores some of the lost information contained in the
original multilateral rankings. It revises the pairwise score for a candidate pair (i, j) by placing a positive
weight on pairwise scores of i against other candidates (the aik ’s) and pairwise scores of j against other
candidates (the ak j). In other words, the data difference between i and j is re-assessed using all possible
indirect evidence concerning i and j against other candidates. Thus, if i won massively against j but lost
against k, whereas j won massively against k, our method will reduce the margin by which i won against
j. These revisions are meant to recapture the spirit of the original multilateral rankings which provided
information about how each candidate stood within the entire group of candidates in voters’ preferences
(rather than how each candidate stood relative to a specific another).
The main result of Chandra-Roy (2013) shows that setting the confidence factor, CF = 1/2 removes the
Condorcet component vector aC from the pairwise scores. The result is reported here without proof. The
interested reader is referred to the earlier paper.
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Theorem 2 (Chandra and Roy (2013)) For CF = 1/2, the vector of revised scores a(1)i j lies in the Transitivity
plane. Specifically, for each (i, j) pair, a(1)i j = (1+
1
2(n−2))aTi j = (1+ 12(n−2))(ai−a j).
The Chandra-Roy algorithm enables us to extract the differences ai− a j for all (i, j) pairs from the
given pairwise scores. Specifically, (ai− a j) = a(1)i j 1(1+ 12 (n−2)) . To extract the coefficients ai themselves, a
normalization is needed - an issue that was not important in the earlier paper but is important now.
Any one of the coefficients ai, i= 1 . . .n may be set to zero to obtain the remaining (n−1) coefficients, in
principle. From the point of view of interpretation, however, it is useful to choose the normalizing coefficient
(the zero coefficient) in such a way that the weights of the remaining (n−1) independent Basic profiles are
non-negative. Hence we use the following algorithm to select the normalizing coefficient.
As the differences (am−an) are ordered, choose the (m,n) pair for which this difference is maximized.
Suppose max(m,n)(am−an) = (ai−a j). Note that (ai−a j)≥ 0 and therefore (a j−ai) =min(m,n)(am−an)≤
0. Set a j = 0 to be the normalizing coefficient.
Note that a j = 0 implies ai ≥ 0. Note that ∀m 6= j, (am−a j) = (am−ai)+(ai−a j). Since (a j−ai)≤
(am−ai)≤ (ai−a j), (am−a j)≥ 0, implying am ≥ a j = 0. Thus all other coefficients are positive.
The Chandra-Roy algorithm provides us with the Condorcet components aCi j = ai j−aTi j = ai j−(ai−a j),
of the pairwise scores but not the weights of the distinct 12(n− 1)! Condorcet profiles themselves. Our
main objective however does not require us to isolate the weights of the individual Condorcet profiles,
as additional collective insight is not gained by distinguishing between the different Condorcet profiles
themselves. Collectively speaking, they all represent heterogenity.
Remark 4: It is important to clarify what the weights of component profiles (Basic, Condorcet and
Reverse) exactly mean. In particular, such weights may in general take on any real value and hence cannot
be interpreted as a ”share or proportion” of the electorate. Using our view of a given profile as a padded
and thinned Kn profile (voters moved from specific rankings to other rankings), a weight ai of the Bni profile
measures the ”thickness” of the padding and thinning performed relative to Vn! , the weight of the K
n profile,
to obtain the given profile. For example, if a profile can be expressed as p = Vn! K
n + aiBni , where ai is also
found to be equal to Vn! , then we conclude that the entire profile has the same structure as a B
n
i profile. The
relative values of the ai coefficients therefore provide direct measure of the relative importance or strength of
these profiles. In order to facilitate this interpretation, it is important that the coefficients ais (and coefficients
of some other component profiles as well) are non-negative. The normalization above achieves this goal.
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4.2 Isolating Reverse profiles
Assume that plurality tallies of all candidates and pairwise scores of all candidate pairs are available. The
following is a second main result of the paper.
Theorem 3 A unique decomposition of the plurality tally differences into two components, one determined
by Basic profiles and the other by Reverse profiles, can be implemented.
Proof: From Theorem 1, plurality tallies are determined by Basic, Reverse and Kn profiles. Assume
that our given profile is a linear combination of n Basic profiles, n Reverse profiles and a Vn! K
n profile. That
is p = ∑ni=1 aiBni +∑
n
i=1 riR
n
i +
V
n! K
n where the unknown coefficients or weights of the Basic and Reverse
profiles are to be obtained from the given data. Moreover, only (n−1) of the Basic profiles and (n−1) of
the Reverse profiles are independent.
From the pairwise scores for each candidate pair for this profile, the differences in the weights of the
component Basic profiles, (ai− a j), can be extracted using Theorem 2. From Proposition 1, the tallies of
Bni and R
n
i are in identical direction, for all i. Define ti as a vector with (n− 1)! as its i-th component and
−(n− 2)! as all the other components. Denote 1 = (1,1, . . .1), a n-component vector. Denote the vector
of plurality tallies of the candidates by τ = (τ1 . . .τn). For a profile p = ∑ni=1 aiBni +∑
n
i=1 riR
n
i +
V
n! K
n, the
plurality tallies can be shown to be
τ=
n
∑
i=1
(ai+ ri)ti+
V
n
1
Denote by α= ∑ni=1(ai+ ri)(n−2)!− Vn . A slight manipulation yields,
τ= n(n−2)!ω−α1
where the n-dimensional vector ω = {ai + ri}ni=1. The difference in the plurality tallies of the i-th and
the j-th candidate is therefore given by
τi− τ j = n(n−2)!((ai−a j)+(ri− r j) (2)
The left hand side (τi− τ j) is obtained from the data. The difference (ai− a j) is obtained from the
pairwise scores and Theorem 2. Therefore the difference (ri− r j) can be calculated. With an appropriate
normalization under which a specific rk is set to zero, the remaining ris can be obtained. Hence the claim is
true. ∆
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In general, any one of the ri coefficients can be normalized to zero to obtain the other coefficients. Our
interpretation of the weights of the component profiles is helped if such weights are non-negative numbers.
Hence for the empirical results in Section 6, we adopt the same normalization technique as we did to obtain
the ai coefficients. In general the candidate whose Basic profile weight has been normalized to be zero may
not turn out to be the same candidate whose Reverse profile weight has been normalized to be zero.
4.3 A 3-candidate illustration
The following preference-profile comes from the election of a president of the Social Choice and Welfare
Society and also used as an example by Balinski and Laraki (2010).
Table 2:
Rankings No. of voters Rankings No.of voters
1. A > B >C 13 4. C > B > A 8
2. A >C > B 11 5. C > A > B 11
3. B >C > A 9 6. B > A >C 0
It is easy to check that C is the Condorcet winner, the majority rule ranking is C > A > B and the Borda
ranking is A > C > B. The pairwise scores are a12 = 9/26, a13 = −1/13 and a23 = −2/13. The plurality
tallies are A = 24,B = 9 and C = 19 inducing the plurality ranking A >C > B.
Applying the Chandra-Roy algorithm, the revised pairwise scores are a(1)12 =
10
26 , a
(1)
13 =
1
52 , and a
(1)
23 =
−1952 . The weights of the Basic profiles are obtained from the differences, aˆ12 = a1−a2 = 2078 , aˆ13 = a1−a3 =
1
78 , aˆ23 = a2−a3 =−1978 . As max(ai−a j) = a1−a2, we normalize a2 = 0, implying a1 = 2078 and a3 = 1978 .
The Basic profile favoring A has a slightly greater weight than the one favoring C. This accounts for the
Borda ranking. The Condorcet components obtained from the pairwise scores and the revised pairwise
scores are, ac12 = a12− a(1)12 = 9/26− 10/26 = −1/26, ac13 = a13− a(1)13 = −1/13− 1/52 = −5/52 and
ac23 = a23− a(1)23 = −2/13+ 19/52 = 11/52. These account for the difference between the Borda ranking
and the majority rule ranking, specifically the switch between A and C.
To obtain the coefficients of the reverse profiles, note that r1 − r2 = 370/78, r1 − r3 = 129/78 and
r2− r3 = −241/78 using the formula of Theorem 3. As the maximum difference is r1− r2, we set r2 = 0
and obtain r1 = 370/78 and r3 = 241/78.
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5 Heterogeneity and Polarization
5.1 Condorcet profiles and heterogeneity
The components {aCi j} and {ai−a j} provide natural measures of heterogeneity and of how sensitive pairwise
procedures in general could be to Condorcet profiles.
A pairwise ranking i > j is defined as a strong reversal of the pairwise ranking i < j and vice versa,
for all (i, j) pairs. The pairwise ranking i > j or i < j is defined as a weak reversal of the pairwise ranking
i∼ j and vice versa, for all (i, j) pairs. the following proposition provides a way of assessing how different
an aggregate ranking based on a pairwise method can be, for a given profile p, from an aggregate ranking
based on the profile’s Basic components only. Recall that all positional methods produce a complete tie
for Condorcet profiles. Thus, in the absence of Reverse profiles, the proposition also provides a way of
assessing how far rankings under positional methods may differ from rankings under pairwise methods, as
such differences under these circumstances are caused by Condorcet profiles only.
Proposition 2 Given any profile p, the pairwise majority ranking of the pair (i, j) is a strong reversal of the
pairwise majority ranking obtained from the Basic profiles, if ai 6= a j and a
C
i j
ai−a j <−1. The pairwise majority
ranking of the pair (i, j) is a weak reversal of the pairwise majority ranking obtained from the Basic profiles
if one of the following holds: (1) aCi j 6= 0 and ai = a j or (2) ai 6= a j and
aCi j
ai−a j =−1.
Proof: Pairwise majority ranking of the pair (i, j) is determined by the the sign of ai j. That is i > j if
ai j > 0, i < j if ai j < 0 and i ∼ j if ai j = 0. The pairwise majority ranking of the pair (i, j) obtained from
the Basic profiles only is determined by the sign of ai− a j. By the previous results, ai j = aCi j +(ai− a j).
Thus ai j and ai−a j have strictly opposite signs if ai−a j 6= 0 and a
C
i j
ai−a j < −1. When ai = a j, the pairwise
ranking obtained from Basic profiles is i ∼ j. The pairwise ranking of the pair (i, j) is determined by the
sign of the Condorcet component aCi j and is a weak reversal of the ranking obtained from the Basic profiles.
When ai 6= a j and a
C
i j
ai−a j =−1, ai j = 0. Thus the pairwise majority ranking of the pair (i, j) is i∼ j but the
ranking from the Basic Profiles is a strict inequality. Hence one is a weak reversal of the other. ∆.
Socio-politically, Condorcet profiles represent a form of preference heterogeneity similar to a Kn profile.
It is therefore important to have a measure of this heterogeneity. The Condorcet components aCi j may be used
to construct several such natural measures. One is the overall contribution of the Condorcet components to
pairwise scores, that is the ratio η1 = ( (a
C)T (aC)
aT a )
1/2. Note that Condorcet components in pairwise scores are
analogous to residual error terms in linear regression exercises. The ratio (a
C)T (aC)
aT a therefore has a similar
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interpretation to the R2 statistic in linear regressions. An alternative measure of heterogeneity is the ratio
η2 = ( 1nC2 ∑i< j
(aCi j)
2
(ai j)2
)1/2. The term
(aCi j)
2
(ai j)2
denotes how important the contribution of the Condorcet component
is in the pairwise score for the (i, j) pair. The ratio η2 thus measures the average contribution of all Condorcet
profiles in determining pairwise scores.
Another useful measure is the proportion of pairwise rankings that are strong or weak reversals of the
pairwise rankings based on Basic profiles, as such reversals are caused only by Condorcet profiles. A
high proportion indicates a sizable presence of such profiles. To this end, define the sets A1 = {(i,k)|i <
k, a
C
ik
ai−ak > −1}, A2 = {(i,k)|i < k,
aCik
ai−ak < −1}, A3 = {(i,k)|i < k,(ai− ak = 0) and aCik 6= 0} and A4 =
{(i,k)|i < k, a
C
i j
ai−a j =−1}, respectively. Thus, A1 is the set of all pairs (i,k), such that their pairwise rankings
and rankings according to their Basic profiles do not differ. A2 is the set of all pairs such that their pairwise
rankings and rankings according to Basic profiles strongly differ. A3 and A4 are the sets of all pairs such
that their pairwise rankings and rankings according to the Basic profiles weakly differ. Further, denote by
Card(S), the cardinality of the set S. Then the total number of pairwise rankings that are strong or weak
reversals of the pairwise rankings based on Basic profiles is Card(A2)+Card(A3)+Card(A4). As the total
number of pairwise orderings is nC2 , the measure is provided by the ratio, Γ=
Card(A2)+Card(A3)+Card(A4)
nC2
.
Γ also provides a measure of how sensitive pairwise procedures in general could be to Condorcet profile
components, under a specific situation. A high value for Γ indicates in general that different pairwise
procedures will yield aggregate rankings that may markedly differ from each other and thus all outcomes
should be regarded as procedure sensitive.
5.2 Reverse profiles, plurality and polarization
A Rnj profile has an equal number of voters placing candidate j in the first and last places. Alternatively, such
a profile has an equal number of voters with a given preference order and its reverse. Thus their weights
can be useful in multiple ways. A Rnj profile with a significant weight may be interpreted as, candidate j is
a polarizing figure - he/she is loved or hated by an equal number of voters. From a social perspective, these
weights may be used to measure how polarized the electorate is - that is how divided the electorate is into
groups with opposite preferences.
From the previous section,
(τi− τ j) = n(n−2)!((ai−a j)+(ri− r j))
As ri ≥ 0 for all i = 1 . . .n with our normalization, we may say that candidate i is more polarizing than
candidate j if ri− r j > 0 - that is, more number of voters place candidate i in first and last places than they
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do candidate j. The larger this difference, the larger the contribution of the Rni profile towards any electoral
win of i over j, under the plurality procedure.
An interesting situation arises when the difference ri− r j is sizable enough to overturn the objective
difference between the two candidates, according to their Basic profiles. From the expression, it follows that
(τi−τ j) and (ai−a j) have the same sign if ri−riai−a j >−1 and opposite signs if
ri−ri
ai−a j <−1, when (ai−a j) 6= 0.
Thus, when (ai−a j) 6= 0 and ri−riai−a j <−1, the relative plurality ranking of the (i, j) pair is a strong reversal
of the relative ranking according to their Basic profiles and the candidate that is higher ranked according to
plurality is significantly more polarizing than the other. When (ai−a j) = 0 but (ri− r j) is strictly positive
or negative, the relative plurality ranking of the (i, j) pair is a weak reversal of the relative ranking according
to their Basic profiles and the higher plurality ranked candidate is more polarizing than the other. Thus
the ratios ri−riai−a j or the quantities (ri− r j) provide information about how polarizing specific candidates are
relative to others. We denote by Ψ the proportion of candidate pairs whose relative ranking under plurality
is a strong or weak reversal of the relative ranking based on Basic profiles. In the absence of Condorcet
profiles, the ratio Ψ measures how far off is the aggregate plurality ranking of the candidates from an
aggregate ranking based on Basic profiles and other pairwise procedures.
We also propose and apply several other direct measures of overall polarization among the electorate.
First is the average ri coefficient over all candidates (denoted r¯ in the tables) and its associated standard
deviation. More meaningful than the average ri itself, in some sense, is the ratio of the average ri to the
average Basic profile coefficient (denoted a¯ in the tables). The ratio r¯a¯ provides an aggregate measure of how
strong the Reverse profiles are relative to Basic profiles and thus to what extent polarized preferences play
a part in determining the plurality outcome. For the Cambridge City Council elections that we specifically
study with our tools and techniques in the next section, we use two sets of the r¯ and r¯a¯ measures - one
measured over all the candidates and the other over the set of the nine winning candidates.
6 Results from the Cambridge City Council Elections
In this section, we test our method and measures on ballot data from the Cambridge (Massachussetts) City
Council elections over the period 1997-2011. Elections are held every two years providing us with eight
years of data.
The data set has certain limitations. The traditional model of social choice assumes voters to have
strict preferences over all candidates. The Cambridge City electoral laws do not require voters to rank all
candidates. Voters must rank at least one of them for the first place and are free to rank as many of the others
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as they like. On an average there are 18 or19 official candidates, indexed C01,C02 . . ., on the ballot for every
election, out of which 9 city council members are elected. Most voters rank about only 4 or 5 candidates.
Thus the major limitation of the data set is that many of the official candidates are not ranked by many of
the voters. A second but minor limitation of the data set is that under the electoral laws, voters also have
the right to vote for unofficial candidates (not on the ballot) by writing their names on the ballot. These
candidates, described as write-in candidates, appear in most cases to be people well known within the very
small group of voters who ranked them but not widely known outside. There was however one exception that
happened in the year 2009. In the year 2009, a candidate who had successfully ran in some of the previous
year elections and thus may be deemed as widely known, was suddenly not included in the official list of
candidates but was ranked in the first position by a significant number of voters as a write-in candidate. For
our analysis for the year 2009, we treated this candidate as an official rather than as a write-in candidate.
Finally, for many of the elections prior to 2005, we found that a significant proportion of the ballots had
multiple candidates ranked in the same position. By the electoral laws, these ballots should be considered
invalid but the total numbers of invalid ballots officially reported for these years are considerably smaller
than what they should have been if all such ballots were considered invalid. This problem is not significant
beginning with 2005 and the voters seem to have become better informed about the official procedures. Thus
for the years 1997-2003, on an average about 8-9% of the total ballots had ties. For the years 2005-2011,
this percentage is about 1-2%.
In keeping with our model, we excluded all ballots where multiple candidates were placed in the same
position and considered only the ballots with strict rankings. Besides the official candidates, there were
typically 7-9 different write-in candidates every year. Instances of the same write-in candidate being ranked
by more than ten voters in any year were very rare, with the exception of 2009 discussed above. Instances
of a write-in candidate, rather than an official candidate, being ranked first were also very few (with the
exception of 2009 elections). We excluded the ballots where a write-in candidate was ranked first, for
reasons explained below, but retained the ballots where a write-in candidate was placed in between two
official candidates, to use the available information about the pairwise rankings of the official candidates.
Thus for the years 1997-2003, about 9% of the ballots and for the years 2005-2011, about 2% of the ballots
were discarded. The high percentage of discards for the years 1997-2003 is responsible for some minor
difference in the plurality ranking of the candidates reported in our tables (which were directly calculated
from the ballots) with the official plurality ranking of them after the first count. These differences are noted
in the tables, wherever they exist.
Excluding the write-in candidates helps us to increase the numerical accuracy of the estimates of the
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Reverse profile coefficients, for reporting purposes, by reducing the value of n(n−2)! in equation 2. This
does not affect the qualitative results, so far as the Reverse profiles are concerned. Note that so far as
isolating the Condorcet components are concerned, Theorem 2 requires using the decomposition method on
pairwise scores for the full set of candidates - official and write-ins. Given that so few voters ranked the
write-in candidates anywhere on the ballots, once again we do not think that excluding the write-ins made
a difference. A more serious problem however, is that so few voters ranked all the official candidates. As
we need voters to order all official candidate pairs to apply Theorem 2, we made the following assumptions
about voters’ preferences regarding the official candidates that they have not ranked. Firstly, we assumed
that if a voter has not ranked a candidate A, then the voter strictly prefers all the candidates that he or she
has ranked to candidate A - in other words, unranked candidates are ranked below the ranked candidates.
Secondly, if a voter has not ranked two candidates A and B, we assumed that the voter prefers A to B with
probability half and B to A with probability half. Thus all voters who did not rank a specific pair (A,B) were
equally distributed between A and B. We consider these assumptions to be the most reasonable under the
circumstances although they have the potential to affect the empirical results. We nevertheless think that
these results are useful as a first attempt to apply the methods and measures discussed in this paper.
The nine members of the City Council are elected under a proportional representation (PR) method over
several counts of the ballots. Under this method a candidate is elected if he/she wins a certain proportion
of the votes, called a quota. The quota is determined by dividing the total number of valid ballots by ten
(the number of candidates to be elected plus one) and adding one to the result. The first count involves
determining the plurality tallies of all the candidates. All candidates who reach the quota after the first count
are declared elected. Any votes they receive beyond the quota are denoted surplus votes. Surplus votes are
transferred to the second choice candidates on the surplus ballots. A formula determines which ballots are
selected as surplus ballots. After surplus votes are transferred, candidates who have fewer than fifty tallies
are eliminated and their votes are transferred to the next in preference. A new ranking is established of the
continuing candidates, after this. The candidate with the lowest number of tallies after the two transfers is
declared defeated and his/her ballots are transferred to the next continuing candidate marked on each ballot.
One a candidate reaches the quota, no more ballots are transferred to him/her. The process continues till all
nine members are elected.
The present paper does not attempt to analyze or critique this specific voting procedure used by the
City Council. Instead our specific objective is to uncover the size of the Basic, Condorcet and Reverse
profiles, for which we directly calculate the necessary pairwise scores and plurality tallies from the ballot
data. Our results however is an indirect comment on the specific PR method as well. Condorcet profiles
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influence the rankings of the continuing candidates when candidates who have already fulfilled the quota
or the bottom ranked candidates are dropped and their votes transferred to the next ranked candidate on the
ballots. Reverse profiles influence the plurality tallies of the first count, thereby influencing the rest of the
PR process and the final outcome. Thus, significant coefficients of these types of profiles would suggest that
the PR method itself may have played a significant role in determining the final outcome of these elections.
To this extent, comparing the final outcomes with our first count results are useful.
Tables 7-15 presents the numerical results of our analysis. Table 7 presents the values obtained for the
various aggregative measures of heterogeneity and polarization discussed in Section 5, for all the years. Ta-
bles 8-15 provide the Basic and Reverse profile coefficients for all the candidates along with their aggregate
rankings based on plurality, the Borda Count and the weights of their Basic profiles, for specific years. The
main findings are summarized below.
6.1 Main results for the period 1997-2011
The values of r¯ and r¯a¯ over all the candidates and over the set of winners (denoted r¯w and
r¯w
a¯w
respectively)
show a clear upward trend in polarization among the Cambridge voters since 2001. In particular, after 2005,
polarized preferences seem to have played a significantly bigger role in determining the set of winners,
compared to before 2005, as evidenced by the values of the ratio r¯wa¯w . The proportion of relative ranking
reversals under plurality, Ψ does not show a trend over the years but is significant at an average of 36
Our results indicate no significant heterogeneity in the Condorcet sense amongst the Cambridge elec-
torate. Neither η1, η2, nor Γ demonstrate any pattern or trend. It should be noted however that on this issue,
the data-set has a limitation discussed earlier that may have affected the results or rather the lack of any.
6.2 Specifc results for each election
1997
About 9% of the ballots cast this year were discarded for the reasons discussed in the first paragraph
of this section. The related differences in our plurality tallies and the official tallies after the first count
are pointed out in the table. Our most noticeable findings are the following. Candidate C12, Borda and ai
ranked 2nd, was edged out by Candidates C06, C13, C14 and C15, all of whom were Borda and ai ranked
below C12, in the first round of counting, because the plurality tallies of the latter were boosted by stronger
Reverse profiles, as evidenced by the higher ri values relative to r12. C12 got elected in the second round
after a transfer of surplus votes from the first round. C14, Borda and ai ranked 6th, edged out C01, Borda
and ai ranked 5th, in the first round of counting because of a stronger Reverse component profile. C01
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eventually got elected in the third round of counting. C06, Borda and ai ranked 7th, is plurality ranked
above C04, Borda and ai ranked 1st, because r6 > r4.
1999
About 9.3% of the ballots cast this year were discarded. Our findings include: Borda and ai 6th ranked
Candidate C08 (r8 = 0.068 approx), edged out Candidate C18 who was Borda and ai 1st ranked (r18 = 0) in
the first count. C18 eventually was elected in the 13th round. C05 who was Borda and ai ranked 4th and C19
who was Borda and ai ranked 5th similarly trailed behind C08 in the first count and eventually got elected
in the 14th and 13th rounds respectively. C20 who was Borda and ai 2nd ranked did not get elected.
2001
About 6.3% of the ballots cast this year were discarded. We find that C12 who was Borda and ai ranked
7th was elected in the first count, whilst C16 who was Borda and ai ranked 2nd was elected in the 13th
count. C17, C03 and C18 who were Borda and ai ranked 4th, 5th and 6th respectively (that is ranked before
C12) were elected in the 7th, 9th and 14th counts. In contrast to what happened in 1999, however, all of the
first nine Borda and ai ranked candidates were eventually elected to the Council. (Explain further)
2003
About 8.8% of the ballots cast this year were discarded. As it happened in 2001, there is a remarkable
consistency between the first nine Borda and ai rankings and the set of candidates who eventually got elected.
A noticeable fact is that candidate C16 who is Borda and ai ranked 3rd got elected in the 13th round, after
candidates C02, C04, C13 and C20, all of them Borda and ai ranked lower than C16, got elected in earlier
rounds. C16 has a lower ri coefficient compared to all of them. Candidate C06 was plurality, Borda and ai
first ranked and also the candidate with the lowest ri coefficient.
2005
About 3.4% of the ballots cast this year were discarded. Amongst the most noticeable findings are: C05
who was Borda and ai ranked 6th got elected in the first round, whereas, C16 who was Borda and ai ranked
1st got elected in the 11th round. C16 got elected in later rounds than C17, C03, C04, C18 and C13, all of
whom were Borda and ai ranked lower than him/her. Note that r16 = 0. whereas the ri of all these candidates
are higher and significantly so in case of C05. Very remarkably, C12 who was Borda and ai ranked 7th did
not get elected, whereas, C10 who was Borda and ai ranked 11th got elected. C10 has a significantly higher
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ri coefficient compared to C12. Even more interestingly, C12 ran and was elected in 1999, 2001 and 2003.
In all these three years he/she showed remarkable consistency in the Borda/ai rankings relative to the other
candidates, being always placed 7th or 8th. C10 ran but lost in 2003 and interestingly enough also had a
significantly high ri coefficient in 2003.
2007
About 1.03% of the ballots cast this year were discarded. Some interesting findings are: C13 who was
Borda and ai ranked 1st got elected in the 9th round whereas Candidates C01, C15 C06 and C11, all of
whom were Borda and ai ranked lower but had higher ri coefficients (significantly so, for C11, C06 and
C15), got elected in earlier rounds. Also notable was that Candidate C13 who ran in 2001, 2003, 2005 and
2007, had low ri coefficients in 2001 and 2003 and had ri = 0 in 2005 and 2007. C16 who was Borda and
ai ranked 9th was defeated but C11 who was Borda and ai ranked 10th but had a higher ri coefficient, was
elected. Two candidates C03 and C14, who have been elected in 1997, 1999, 2001, 2003 and 2005 were
defeated in 2007. Further both had low, sometimes 0, ri coefficients in all the years they were elected. In
2007 when they were defeated, their ri coefficients were significantly higher compared to the earlier years,
specially so for C03. Thus both candidates became significantly more polarizing figures in 2007 compared
to what they were earlier. The year 2007 also marks the beginning of a period during which a significant
number of candidates appear with high ri coefficients, some of them amongst the winners.
2009
Only 0.8% of the ballots cast this year were discarded. Write-in candidate, WI01 is designated the 21st
official candidate in our table. Amongst the findings are: A significant number of candidates have high
ri coefficients, some of them amongst the winners...Candidate C19 who was Borda and ai ranked 4th and
Candidate C18 who was Borda and ai ranked 9th were not elected. Candidates WI01 who was Borda and ai
ranked 21st and Candidate C02 who was Borda and ai ranked 10th were elected. Candidate WI01 had won
as an ”official” candidate in 1999, 2001, 2003, 2005 and 2007, had ri coefficients generally less than 0.1
during these years. In 2009 his/her ri was the highest at 0.5 approx. WI01 also had the lowest ai coefficient
at 0. Four out of the nine elected candidates had ri coefficients that were significantly higher compared to
pre-2007 norms.
2011
About 1.3% of the ballots cast this year were discarded. A significantly large number of candidates had
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significantly higher ri coefficients compared to pre-2007 norms. Only three out of eighteen candidates had ri
coefficients less than 0.1 and four candidates had ri coefficients higher than 0.4. Six out of the nine winners
had significant ri coefficients. Other interesting findings are, Candidate C12 who was Borda and ai ranked
4th and Candidate C17 who was Borda and ai ranked 9th were not elected. Instead Candidate C04 who was
Borda and ai ranked 11th and Candidate C16 who was Borda and ai ranked 10th were elected. Candidate
C13 who was Borda and ai ranked 2nd was elected in the 13th round whereas C15 and CC05 who were
Borda and ai ranked lower but had higher ri coefficients were elected in earlier rounds.
7 Appendix I
This section provides 3-candidate illustrations of the concepts and results presented in Section 2 of the paper.
7.1 Basic, Condorcet profiles, pairwise scores with 3 candidates
In a 3-candidate election, there are 3! = 6 possible rankings of the candidates A, B and C. The rankings are
numbered as follows:
Table 3:
1. A > B >C 4. C > B > A
2. A >C > B 5. B >C > A
3. C > A > B 6. B > A >C
Assume A is candidate 1, B is candidate 2 and C is candidate 3. Using the above numbering scheme, the
Basic profiles for the 3-candidate field are given by, B31 = (1,1,0,−1,−1,0), B32 = (0,−1,−1,0,1,1), and
B33 = (−1,0,1,1,0,−1) where the components of each vector represent the number of voters favoring the
specific ranking. Note that B31+B
3
2+B
3
3 = 0.
To use the terminology of Section 2, the vectors B31, B
3
2 and B
3
3 are strictly speaking profile differentials
because they have negative components. However each B3i has the same election outcomes as B
3
i +K
3 where
K3 = (1,1,1,1,1,1). As K3 has one voter favoring each ranking, it does not influence any election outcome.
Note that B31 +K
3 = (2,2,1,0,0,1). Under the profile B31 +K
3 = (2,2,1,0,0,1), A unanimously wins both
pairwise elections against B or C. B and C are tied when pitted against each other. Intuitively speaking,
the profile B31 or B
3
1 +K
3 = (2,2,1,0,0,1) may be thought of as representing the ”base” of candidate A.
Everyone in this group of voters likes A best and is indifferent between the others.
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There is a unique reference ranking and only one distinct Condorcet profile for a 3-candidate field. The
Condorcet 3-tuple c3(1) and its reversal set ρ(c(1))
3 are the set of rankings in the table below.
Table 4:
c3(1) ρ(c(1))
3
A > B >C C > B > A
B >C > A A >C > B
C > A > B B > A >C
Using the previous numbering scheme, the Condorcet profile for a 3-candidate field is described by the
vector, C3 = (1,−1,1,−1,1,−1)
As the number of candidates increases, the dimension of the voters’ profile and the number of distinct
Condorcet profiles gets large very quickly. In a 4-candidate field the number of all possible rankings of the
candidates is 24, implying that the Basic and the Condorcet profiles are 24-dimensional vectors. There are
4 Basic profiles (three of which are independent) and 3 distinct Condorcet profiles. In a 6-candidate field
there are 6 Basic profiles and 60 distinct Condorcet profiles, each being a 6!-dimensional vector.
There are three possible pairwise scores in a 3-candidate field and hence BS(3) is a 3-dimensional cube
with each side given by the interval [−1,1]. Denoting candidate A as 1, B as 2 and C as 3, a vector in BS(3)
is represented as a = (a12,a13,a23). For comparison, BS(4) is a 6-dimensional cube.
In a 3-candidate field, the vectors of normalized pairwise score differentials generated by the 3 Basic
profiles are T 31 = (1,1,0), T
3
2 = (−1,0,1), and T 33 = (0,−1,−1). It is easy to check that these three vectors
are linearly dependent and hence span a 2-dimensional subspace of BS(3). The 2-dimensional subspace
spanned by the three vectors form the Transitivity plane for the 3-candidate field.
In the 3-candidate field, the unique Condorcet profile generates the directional vector q=(a12,a13,a23)=
(1,−1,1) in BS(3), implying the well known Condorcet triplet that A unanimously beats B, B unanimously
beats C and C unanimously beats A. For comparison, in a 4-candidate field there are three distinct Condorcet
profiles and hence three such 6-dimensional directional vectors. In a 5-candidate field there are twelve 10-
dimensional directional vectors. As the number of distinct Condorcet profiles increase very rapidly with
the candidates, characterizing the directional vectors for these profile becomes a long and involved process.
This is one reason why direct profile decomposition is difficult to implement if n > 4.
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7.2 Basic and Condorcet profile decomposition with 3 candidates
Suppose that an electorate can be described by the following combination of Basic and Condorcet profiles
p = aB31+bB
3
2+ cB
3
3+dC
3
where a, b, c and d are any constants and the vectors B31, B
3
2, B
3
3, and C
3 are as defined above.
It is easy to check that the number of voters favoring each possible ranking within the profile are as
given in Table 4.
Table 5:
ranking no.of voters ranking no. of voters
A > B >C (a− c+d) C > B > A (−a+ c−d)
A >C > B (a−b−d) B >C > A (−a+b+d)
C > A > B (−b+ c+d) B > A >C (b− c−d)
The pairwise election tallies are calculated to be (A : B) = ((2a− 2b+ d) : (2b− 2a− d)), (A : C) =
((2a−2c−d) : (2c−2a+d)), and (B : C) = ((2b−2c+d) : (2c−2b−d)). Note that the pairwise tallies
depend on the relative weights of the two relevant Basic profiles and the weight of the Condorcet profile.
Further each pairwise score difference is a direct sum of a Transitive component and a Condorcet component.
For example, the pairwise score difference for the (A,B) pair is (4a− 4b+ 2d) (A’s tally minus B’s tally).
The Transitive component is 4a− 4b and the Condorcet component is 2d. The pairwise score difference
for the (A,C) pair is (4a−4c−2d) (A’s tally minus C’s tally). The pairwise score difference for the (B,C)
pair is (4b− 4c+ 2d) (B’s tally minus C’s tally). The Transitive components satisfy the additive transitive
property because (A’s tally minus B’s tally = 4a−4b) plus (B’s tally minus C’s tally = 4b−4c) equals (A’s
tally minus C’s tally = 4a−4c). Note that the Condorcet components don’t satisfy this property.
When all three candidates are running the race (a complete field election), the Borda scores are found
to be A : (4a−2c−2b), B : (4b−2a−2c) and C : (4c−2a−2b). Note that under this scenario, the Borda
scores are unaffected by the weight d of the Condorcet profile as the Condorcet components cancel out when
the pairwise tallies are added.
If however A drops out of the race, the Borda scores for B and C become 2b− 2c+ d and 2c− 2b− d
respectively (the same as the pairwise scores) and now depend on the weight of the Condorcet profile.
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8 Appendix II
Using the reference ranking of Table ( 3), R31 = (1,1,−2,1,1,−2), R32 = (−2,1,1,−2,1,1) and R33 =
(1,−2,1,1,−2,1). The following table provides a reference ranking for a 4-candidate field and the as-
sociated R41 and R
4
2 profiles.
Table 6:
Reference ranking R41 R
4
2 Reference ranking R
4
1 R
4
2
1. A > B >C > D (1) (-1) 13. D >C > B > A (1) (-1)
2. A > B > D >C (1) (-1) 14. C > D > B > A (1) (-1)
3. A >C > B > D (1) (-1) 15. D > B >C > A (1) (-1)
4. A >C > D > B (1) (1) 16. B > D >C > A (1) (1)
5. A > D >C > B (1) (1) 17. B >C > D > A (1) (1)
6. A > D > B >C (1) (-1) 18. C > B > D > A (1) (-1)
7. B > A >C > D (-1) (1) 19. D >C > A > B (-1) (1)
8. B > A > D >C (-1) (1) 20. C > D > A > B (-1) (1)
9. C > A > B > D (-1) (-1) 21. D > B > A >C (-1) (-1)
10. C > A > D > B (-1) (1) 22. B > D > A >C (-1) (1)
11. D > A > B >C (-1) (-1) 23. C > B > A > D (-1) (-1)
12. D > A >C > B (-1) (1) 24. B >C > A > D (-1) (1)
Proof of Proposition 1
Part 1: Assume k = 2 to start with. Also, without loss of generality, consider the pair (Rn1,R
n
2). R
n
1
has non-zero voters for A in the 1-st, 2-nd, (n− 1)-th and n-th places. Rn2 has non-zero voters for B in the
1-st, 2-nd, (n−1)-th and n-th places. The inner product of (Rn1)T and Rn2 have non-zero components for all
rankings in which (1) A is in the 1-st place and B is in the 2-nd, (n−1)-th or n-th place (2) A is in the 2-nd
place and B is in the 1-st, (n−1)-th or n-th place (3) A is in the (n−1)-th place and B is in the 1-st, 2-nd or
n-th place and (4) A is in the n-th place and B is in the 1-st, 2-nd or (n−1)-th place. In each of these cases
(a total of twelve cases), A and B can be placed in their positions in (n−2)! ways. The relevant components
of Rn1 and R
n
2 belong to the set {1,−1}. The non-zero components of the inner product equal
−(n−2)!− (n−2)!+(n−2)!− (n−2)!+(n−2)!− (n−2)!− (n−2)!+(n−2)!
−(n−2)!+(n−2)!− (n−2)!− (n−2)! =−4(n−2)!
Hence Rn1 and R
n
2 are not orthogonal. By way of illustration, for n= 3and4, (R
3
1)
T R32 =−6 and (R41)T R42 =
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−8. The argument extends to all pairs of Rni profiles for k = 2.
Next note that all the previous steps of the proof apply directly without any changes to any k < n+12 .
Now suppose we choose k = n+12 which can only happen if n is odd. Note that the candidate I can be in
the k-th place in (n−1)! rankings and that half of these rankings are reversals of the other half. Each such
ranking has (-2) voters by construction. The inner product of (Rn1)
T and Rn2 have non-zero components for
all rankings in which (1) A is in the 1-st place and B is in the n+12 -th or n-th place (2) A is in the
n+1
2 -th place
and B is in the 1-st, or n-th place (3) A is in the n-th place and B is in the 1-st, n+12 -th place. The non-zero
components of the inner product equal
−2(n−2)!+(n−2)!−2(n−2)!−2(n−2)!+(n−2)!−2(n−2)! = −6(n−2)!
which is not 0. Hence the non-orthogonality claim is true for any k and for all pairs of generic Reverse
profiles.
Consider the sum ∑ni=1 Rni for k = 2. Only four out of these n profiles at a time contribute non-zero
voters for each ranking. Two of the profiles contribute (1) voter each for the first and last places. The other
two profiles contribute (-1) each for the 2-nd and (n− 1)-th places. Hence the sum is 0. Using similar
argument, it is clear that the sum of any (n− 1) profiles out of the n profiles is not 0. Hence the set spans
a (n− 1) dimensional subspace, for k = 2. The steps apply directly without any changes to any k < n+12 .
When k = n+12 , three out of these profiles contribute non-zero voters for each ranking at a time. Two of the
profiles contribute (1) voter each for the first and last places. The profile contributes (-2) each for the n+12 -th
place. Hence the sum is 0
Part 2: Consider the inner product of (Rni )
T and Bni , for any given k. This has non-zero components for
all rankings in which (1) candidate I is in the 1-st place and (2) candidate I is in the n-th or last place. As
there are (n−1)! rankings in which candidate I is 1-st ranked and another (n−1)! rankings in which he/she
is last ranked, the non-zero components equal (n− 1)!.(1).(1)− (n− 1)!.(1).(−1) = 0. Hence this pair is
orthogonal to each other.
Next assume that k = 2 and consider the inner product of (Rni )
T and Bnj , where i 6= j. This has non-
zero components for all rankings in which (1) candidate J is in the 1-st place and I is in the 2-nd place (2)
candidate J is in the 1-st place and I is in the (n−1)-th place (3) candidate J is in the n-th place and I is in the
2-nd place and (4) candidate J is in the n-th place and I is in the (n−1)-th place. The non-zero components
equal −(n−2)!− (n−2)!+(n−2)!+(n−2)! = 0. Hence these two vectors are orthogonal and the claim
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is true.
Again, the arguments extend directly without any changes for any k < n+12 . When k =
n+1
2 , the inner
product has non-zero components for all rankings in which (1) candidate J is in the 1-st place and I is in the
n+1
2 -th place (2) candidate J is in the n-th place and I is in the
n+1
2 -th place. The non-zero components equal
−2(n−2)!+2(n−2)! = 0. Hence claim is true for any given k.
Part 3: Under a Bni profile, candidate I is ranked first (n−1)! times and hence receives as many points.
Candidate J receives non-zero votes only for rankings in which he/she is ranked first and candidate I is
ranked last. There are (n− 2)! such rankings each with (-1) voter. Thus every other candidate receives
−(n− 2)! points. Under a Rni profile, with k = 2, candidate I is ranked first (n− 1)! times and receives as
many points. Candidate J receives non-zero votes for every ranking in which (1) J is first ranked and I is
second ranked (2) J is first ranked and I is (n−1)-th ranked (3) J is first ranked and I is n-th ranked. There
are (n−2)! rankings in each category. J receives (-1) for each ranking in the first two categories and (1) for
each ranking in the last category. Hence J receives −(n−2)! points.
These tallies remain unchanged for any k < n+12 . For k =
n+1
2 , candidate J receives non-zero votes for
every ranking in which (1) J is first ranked and I is n+12 -th ranked (2) J is first ranked and I is n-th ranked.
There are (n−2)! rankings in each category. J receives (-2) for each ranking in the first category and (1) for
each ranking in the last category. Hence J receives −(n−2)! points.
The total number of voters in a Bni +K
n profile is 2(n−1)!+(n−2)(n−1)! = n!. The total number of
voters in a Rni +K
n profile is 2(n−1)!+2(n−1)!+(n−4)(n−1)!= n! for n > 3. The normalized plurality
scores can be derived using the previous steps. Under a Rni profile, each ranking and its reversal has the same
number of voters. Hence pairwise scores are a complete tie for each candidate pair.
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Table 7: Heterogeneity, polarization measures by years
Years η1 η2 Γ r¯ Std(ri) r¯a¯ r¯w
r¯w
a¯w
Ψ
1997 0.016 0.120 0.06 0.203 0.153 0.94 0.070 0.20 0.40
1999 0.026 0.119 0.05 0.173 0.110 0.88 0.071 0.24 0.61
2001 0.016 0.095 0.07 0.193 0.146 0.77 0.061 0.16 0.23
2003 0.020 0.128 0.11 0.153 0.125 0.78 0.029 0.09 0.34
2005 0.009 0.087 0.03 0.224 0.171 0.85 0.089 0.22 0.34
2007 0.018 0.073 0.07 0.215 0.145 0.89 0.111 0.32 0.38
2009 0.039 0.141 0.06 0.240 0.146 0.92 0.150 0.43 0.32
2011 0.010 0.050 0.03 0.240 0.151 1.06 0.126 0.38 0.26
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η1 vs Election Year η2 vs Election Year
Γ vs Election Year r¯ with Std(ri) vs Election Year
r¯
a¯ vs Election Year r¯w vs Election Year
r¯w
a¯w
vs Election Year Ψ vs Election Year
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Table 8: 1997 elections: a2 = 0, r4 = 0
Status Candidates Plurality rank Borda rank ai Rank by ai ri Rank by ri
E, 3rd C01 6 5 0.378680243 5 0.040926482 15
D C02 10 19 0 19 0.419606726 1
E, 14th C03 9 8 0.33295654 8 0.086650186 12
E, 1st C04 2 1 0.419606726 1 0 19
D C05 15 18 0.001354005 18 0.418252721 2
E, 1st C06 1 7 0.3532176 7 0.066389126 13
E, 11th C07 11 11 0.136258229 11 0.283348497 9
D C08 18* 17 0.041575915 17 0.378030811 3
D C09 14 14 0.094198304 14 0.325408422 6
D C10 16 16 0.066836377 16 0.352770349 4
D C11 8 9 0.265489111 9 0.154117615 11
E, 2nd C12 7 2 0.401894381 2 0.017712344 18
E, 1st C13 5 3 0.387539479 3 0.032067247 17
E, 1s C14 4 6 0.354014073 6 0.065592653 14
E, 1st C15 3 4 0.384610907 4 0.034995819 16
D C16 12 13 0.108161096 13 0.31144563 7
D C17 17* 12 0.07116184 12 0.348444886 5
D C18 19* 15 0.126075622 15 0.293531104 8
D C19 13 10 0.188120905 10 0.231485821 10
Average 0.216407966 0.20319876
E, . = elected, count; D = defeated
C08 is ranked 17th, C18 is ranked 18th and C17 is ranked19th officially, after the first count.
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Table 9: 1999 elections: a3 = 0, r18 = 0
Status Candidates Plurality rank Borda rank ai Rank by ai ri Rank by ri
E, 11th C01 2 3 0.344874753 3 0.02540773 22
E, 14th C02 4* 10 0.24075288 10 0.129529603 15
D C03 19 24 0 24 0.370282483 1
D C04 24 23 0.05359921 23 0.316683273 2
E, 14th C05 5* 4 0.336589054 4 0.033693429 21
E, 13th C06 3 8 0.266562658 8 0.103719824 17
D C07 20 18 0.098987012 18 0.271295471 7
E, 1st C08 1 6 0.302314402 6 0.067968081 19
D C09 18 19 0.097422518 19 0.272859965 6
D C10 11 16 0.134397888 16 0.235884595 9
D C11 14 20 0.091334976 20 0.278947506 5
D C12 22 22 0.064651179 22 0.305631304 3
E, 14th C13 10 7 0.279454437 7 0.090828046 18
D C14 21 21 0.087428112 21 0.282854371 4
D C15 16* 15 0.151139721 15 0.219142762 10
E, 14th C16 7 11 0.217337913 11 0.15294457 14
D C17 13 12 0.189360568 12 0.180921915 13
E, 13th C18 8 1 0.370282483 1 0 24
E, 13th C19 6* 5 0.332297621 5 0.037984862 20
D C20 9 2 0.349856661 2 0.020425822 23
D C21 12 14 0.165788278 14 0.204494205 11
D C22 17 13 0.187533868 13 0.182748615 12
D C23 15* 9 0.255204783 9 0.1150777 16
D C24 23 17 0.108824095 17 0.261458388 8
Average 0.196916461 0.173366022
E, . = elected, count; D = defeated
C02 is ranked 5th, C05 is ranked 6th and C19 is ranked 4th, officially, after the first count. C15 is ranked
15th and C23 is ranked 16th, officially, after the first count.
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Table 10: 2001 elections: a1 = 0, r5 = 0
Status Candidates Plurality rank Borda rank ai Rank by ai ri Rank by ri
D C01 18 19 0 19 0.443075497 1
E, 1st C02 3 3 0.414859265 3 0.028216232 17
E, 9th C03 4 5 0.381725656 5 0.061349841 15
D C04 16 18 0.028673663 18 0.414401835 2
E, 1st C05 1 1 0.443075497 1 0 19
D C06 15* 17 0.093947775 17 0.349127722 3
D C07 14* 12 0.202280531 12 0.240794966 8
D C08 12 13 0.127292042 13 0.315783455 7
D C09 13 15 0.105527986 15 0.337547511 5
D C010 11 11 0.268463485 11 0.174612012 9
E, 15th C011 10 8 0.3472017 8 0.095873797 12
E, 1st C012 2 7 0.350806973 7 0.092268524 13
D C013 17 16 0.095946023 16 0.347129474 4
D C014 9 10 0.275782371 10 0.167293126 10
E, 15th C015 8 9 0.319238258 9 0.123837239 11
E, 13th C016 6 2 0.417958958 2 0.025116539 18
E, 7th C017 7 4 0.388129682 4 0.054945816 16
E, 14th C018 5 6 0.373479872 6 0.069595626 14
D C019 19 14 0.120370398 14 0.322705099 6
Average 0.250250533 0.192824964
E, . = elected, count; D = defeated
C06 is ranked 14th, C07 is ranked 15th, officially, after the first count.
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Table 11: 2003 elections: a5 = 0, r6 = 0
Status Candidates Plurality rank Borda rank ai Rank by ai ri Rank by ri
D C01 13 13 0.142250572 13 0.204323903 8
E, 9th C02 2 5 0.322525198 5 0.024049277 16
D C03 8 16 0.074460729 16 0.272113746 5
E, 12th C04 7* 7 0.30908604 7 0.037488436 14
D C05 19 20 0 2 0.346574475 1
E, 1st C06 1 1 0.346574475 1 0 20
D C07 20 18 0.02376686 18 0.322807616 3
D C08 18 17 0.056103618 17 0.290470857 4
D C09 12 14 0.125982373 14 0.220592102 7
D C10 15 12 0.161708137 12 0.184866339 9
D C11 17 19 0.018420412 19 0.328154063 2
E, 13th C12 9 8 0.299381604 12 0.047192871 13
E, 12th C13 6* 4 0.325076691 4 0.021497784 17
D C14 11 11 0.165160442 11 0.181414033 10
E, 13th C15 5 9 0.254813264 9 0.091761211 12
E, 13th C16 10 3 0.337468958 3 0.009105517 18
D C17 14 15 0.074738277 15 271836198 6
E, 10th C18 3 2 0.344553732 2 0.002020743 19
D C19 16 10 0.181930175 10 0.164644301 11
E, 12th C20 4 6 0.317334567 6 0.029239908 15
Average 0.194066806 0.152507669
E, . = elected, count; D = defeated
C06 is ranked 6th and C13 is ranked 7th, officially, after the first count.
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Table 12: 2005 elections: a2 = 0, r16 = 0
Status Candidates Plurality rank Borda rank ai Rank by ai ri Rank by ri
D C01 13 17 0.027062433 17 0.459551143 2
D C02 18 18 0 18 0.486613576 1
E, 9th C03 3 3* 0.434377909 3 0.052235667 16
E, 9th C04 2 5 0.409046092 5 0.077567484 14
E, 1st C05 1 6 0.405791705 6 0.080821871 13
D C06 12 12 0.150867032 12 0.335746544 7
D C07 15 16 0.066018547 16 0.420595029 3
D C08 17 15 0.071293136 15 0.41532044 4
D C09 14 13 0.094715069 13 0.391898507 6
E, 11th C10 9 11 0.230661564 11 0.255952012 8
D C11 16 14 0.09189506 14 0.394718516 5
D C12 11 7 0.393973868 7 0.092639708 12
E, 10th C13 7 4 0.424111421 4 0.062502155 15
E, 11th C14 8 8 0.37030372 8 0.116309856 11
D C15 10 10 0.257144827 10 0.229468749 9
E, 11th C16 6 1 0.486613576 1 0 18
E, 5th C17 4* 2 0.467411315 2 0.019202262 17
E, 10th C18 5 9 0.35467301 9 0.131940566 10
Average 0.263108905 0.223504671
E, . = elected, count; D = defeated
C03 is ranked 4th and C17 is ranked 3rd, officially, after the first count.
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Table 13: 2007 elections: a8 = 0, r13 = 0
Status Candidates Plurality rank Borda rank ai Rank by ai ri Rank by ri
E, 1st C01 1 2 0.423140965 2 0.033877992 15
E, 9th C02 7 4 0.364579521 4 0.092439435 13
D C03 12 14 0.051708995 14 0.405309961 3
D C04 13 13 0.07408695 13 0.382932006 4
E, 10th C05 6 7 0.268489717 7 0.18852924 10
E, 7th C06 3 6 0.339173315 6 0.117845642 11
D C07 14 12 0.123069604 12 0.333949352 5
D C08 15 16 0 16 0.457018956 1
E, 9th C09 5 3 0.39536522 3 0.061653736 14
D C10 16 15 0.051553466 15 0.40546549 2
E, 8th C11 4 10 0.242232672 10 0.214786284 7
E, 10th C12 8 8 0.265616995 8 0.191401962 9
E, 9th C13 9 1 0.457018956 1 0 16
D C14 10 11 0.19453085 11 0.262488106 6
E, 6th C15 2 5 0.355915612 5 0.101103345 12
D C16 11 9 0.262945546 9 0.19407341 8
Average 0.241839274 0.215179682
E, . = elected, count; D = defeated
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Table 14: 2009 elections: a21 = 0, r14 = 0
Status Candidates Plurality rank Borda rank ai Rank by ai ri Rank by ri
D C01 18 19 0.100249059 19 0.399637763 3
E, 17th C02 10 10 0.264162972 10 0.235723819 12
E, 1st C03 1 2 0.470059345 2 0.029827446 20
D C04 17 18 0.109561943 18 0.390324849 4
D C05 15 15 0.159057867 15 0.340828924 7
E, 15th C06 6 7 0.331563707 7 0.168323085 15
D C07 16 16 0.153278278 16 0.346608513 6
E, 16th C08 4 6 0.422708423 6 0.077178369 16
D C09 13 14 0.171308213 14 0.328578579 8
D C10 21 20 0.094439678 20 0.405447114 2
D C11 20 17 0.141528433 17 0.358358358 5
E, 16th C12 7 8 0.284016159 8 0.215870633 14
E, 17th C13 8 5 0.42332809 5 0.076558702 17
E, 1st C14 2 1 0.499886792 1 0 21
D C15 14 12 0.219237094 12 0.280649697 10
D C16 9 11 0.250363459 11 0.249523333 11
E, 1st C17 3 3 0.451838744 3 0.048048048 19
D C18 12 9 0.283706325 9 0.216180466 13
D C19 11 4 0.445796987 4 0.054089804 18
D C20 19 13 0.189624148 13 0.310262644 9
E, 17th WI01 5 21 0 21 0.499886792 1
Average 0.260272177 0.239614615
E, . = elected, count; D = defeated
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Table 15: 2011 elections: a8 = 0, r1 = 0
Status Candidates Plurality rank Borda rank ai Rank by ai ri Rank by ri
E, 1st C01 1 1 0.460430347 1 0 18
E, 9th C02 4 3 0.393626618 3 0.066803729 16
E, 14th C03 6 8 0.280711324 8 0.179719023 11
E, 13th C04 7 11 0.230369018 11 0.230061328 8
E, 1st C05 3 6 0.334550108 6 0.125880239 13
D C06 13 15 0.051566073 15 0.408864274 4
D C07 16 16 0.027006804 16 0.433423542 3
D C08 18 18 0 18 0.460430374 1
D C09 12 12 0.115530661 12 0.344899686 7
D C10 17 17 0.02006979 17 0.440360557 2
E, 14th C11 9 7 0.300004895 7 0.160425452 12
D C12 11 4 0.354312208 4 0.106118139 15
E, 13th C13 5 2 0.41154957 2 0.048880777 17
D C14 14 13 0.112446766 13 0.347983581 6
E, 1st C15 2 5 0.342165439 5 0.118264907 14
E, 14th C16 8 10 0.258557632 10 0.201872714 9
D C17 10 9 0.270571534 9 0.0.189858812 10
D C18 15 14 0.061579989 14 0.0.398850358 5
Average 0.223613821 0.236816526
E, . = elected, count; D = defeated
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